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Abstract 
In this research, we investigate the impact of delegating decision making to information technology (IT) 
on an important human decision bias – the sunk cost effect. To address our research question, we use a 
unique and very rich dataset containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-
bid auctions. Thus, unlike previous studies that are primarily laboratory experiments, we investigate the 
effects of using IT on the proneness to a decision bias in real market transactions. We identify and 
analyze irrational decision scenarios of auction participants. We find that participants with a higher 
monetary investment have an increased likelihood of violating the assumption of rationality, due to the 
sunk cost effect. Interestingly, after controlling for monetary investments, participants who delegate their 
decision making to IT and, consequently, have comparably lower behavioral investments (e.g., emotional 
attachment, effort, time) are less prone to the sunk cost effect. In particular, delegation to IT reduces the 
impact of overall investments on the sunk cost effect by approximately 50%.  
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1. Introduction 
“One of philosophy’s oldest paradoxes is the apparent contradiction between the great triumphs and the 
dramatic failures of the human mind. The same organism that routinely solves inferential problems too 
subtle and complex for the mightiest computers often makes errors in the simplest of judgments about 
everyday events.” (Nisbett and Ross 1980)  
“We’re wondering what a world looks like when there are a billion of these software agents transacting 
business on our behalf.” – Dr. Steve R. White, IBM Research (Chang 2002)  
During the last decade, the role of information technology (IT) has evolved from being a decision aid to 
being a decision making artifact. Accordingly, nowadays, IT can not only support decision makers, but 
also make decisions on behalf of their owners (Chang 2002, Greenwald and Boyan 2001). Examples of 
these technologies include options for involving automated agents for bidding in online auctions 
(Adomavicius et al. 2009) or for trading in financial markets (Hendershott et al. 2011). Today, these 
agents are available at negligible marginal cost and can effectively act on behalf of their owners. As a 
result, for instance, in 2009 as much as 73% of all equity trading volume in the United States was 
executed by electronic agents (Mackenzie 2009). Not surprisingly, a significant literature has emerged, 
analyzing the design of these software agents, their performance in real market situations, and their effect 
on market outcomes (e.g., Guo et al. 2011, Hinz et al. 2011, Stone and Greenwald 2005). However, 
despite the widespread usage of these agents, the understanding of how delegating decision making to IT 
impacts different facets of decision making, especially decision biases, is still significantly lacking. 
Considering the economic importance of these decision biases (DellaVigna 2009), it is, nevertheless, 
critical to analyze the effects that the delegation of decision making to automated software agents has on 
the occurrence of decision biases. 
Studies of decision biases have been featured in the literature for many decades (e.g., Camerer et al. 2004, 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Pope and Schweitzer 2011), including both laboratory and field research 
(overviews can be found in Camerer et al. 2004, DellaVigna 2009). One important challenge for 
researchers is to provide ways and means of how these biases can be alleviated or even avoided. 
Researchers from the information systems discipline have already made useful contributions in this area. 
Several laboratory experiments have shown that decision support systems (DSS) are an effective tool for 
alleviating some of these decision biases (e.g., Bhandari et al. 2008, Lim et al. 2000, Roy and Lerch 
1996). However, none of these studies analyzed the role that automated software agents, which 
effectively replaces the decision maker for the delegated task and period, might have on the occurrence of 
decision biases in subsequent human decisions. In addition, there exists no evidence that the laboratory 
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results associated with DSS and decision biases are transferable to real market situations. This handicaps 
academics as well as practitioners because many scholars are skeptical about the transferability of lab 
results to the field (Levitt and List 2008, List 2003). Consequently, we investigate whether or not IT can 
indeed alleviate a decision bias in real market transactions. 
One frequently occurring decision bias is called the ‘sunk cost effect’. It has been defined as “a greater 
tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made” (Arkes 
and Blumer 1985). The sunk cost effect typically occurs in decision situations involving a chain of 
decisions (e.g., software projects, investments, exploration ventures, auctions) (Kanodia et al. 1989). In 
many of these situations, it is now possible to delegate parts of the decision making to IT (Chang 2002, 
Greenwald and Boyan 2001). Therefore, both researchers and practitioners would benefit from a better 
understanding of the impact of delegation to IT on the sunk cost effect. In this research, we have been 
fortunate enough to be able to address this issue by analyzing data obtained from a real market setting. In 
particular, we focus on the following research question: Does the delegation of parts of the actual 
decision making to IT affect the proneness to the sunk cost effect in a real market situation? 
We consider explicitly if the delegation of decision making to IT decreases behavioral investments and if 
there is a sunk cost effect for these kinds of investments. While there is anecdotal evidence that the 
delegation of decision making to IT can reduce behavioral investments (Bapna 2003), we do not know of 
any paper which empirically investigates this issue. In addition, there is no clear picture of the impact of 
behavioral investments on the sunk cost effect. Some experimental studies have found a positive effect of 
behavioral investments on the sunk cost effect (e.g., Cunha and Caldieraro 2009, 2010, Navarro and 
Fantino 2009) while other scholars fail to replicate these experimental results (Otto 2010) or argue that 
there is no sunk cost effect for a behavioral investment such as time (Soman 2001). 
The recent rise in online pay-per-bid auctions (e.g., beezid.com, bidcactus.com) gives us a real market 
setting to answer our research question. 2 The growth in popularity of this type of auction has attracted a 
lot of media attention (e.g., Harford 2010, Thaler 2009). For example, Thaler (2009) writes in the New 
York Times about a big pay-per-bid auction website: “Here, the theory [of the sunk cost effect] is 
employed in some diabolically inventive ways.” In particular, we use a unique and very rich dataset 
provided by a German website offering pay-per-bid auctions with direct buy option.3 This dataset 
includes detailed customer level bidding and transaction data from approximately 7,000 auctions between 
                                                     
2 In September 2011, 5.5 million unique visitors visited pay-per-bid auction websites. This corresponds to 7.3% of the unique 
visitors on the biggest auction website worldwide – ebay.com (Platt et al. 2012). 
3 The website has requested to remain anonymous. 
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August 2009 and May 2010. Furthermore, our dataset allows us to distinguish on a bid level if a bid was 
placed manually or via an automated bidding agent. This unique feature of our dataset allows us to 
analyze the effect of delegating to IT on the proneness to the sunk cost effect.  
We analyze normatively irrational decision scenarios of auction participants.  In our empirical analysis, 
we find that the likelihood of making an irrational decision is significantly influenced by a participant’s 
investments during an auction. Consistent with the sunk cost literature, this likelihood is an increasing 
function of the bidding fees paid in a specific auction: For example, a participant who invested aggregated 
bidding fees of $20 is much more likely to make an irrational decision than a participant who only 
invested $1 in the same auction. This realization of the sunk cost effect is moderated by the usage of an 
automated bidding agent. In specific, delegating actual bidding to an automated bidding agent and, 
consequently, incurring comparably lower behavioral investments significantly influences a participant’s 
proneness to the sunk cost effect. For such participants, the likelihood of violating rationality due to sunk 
costs is significantly lower compared to those who place their bids manually. 
This paper makes novel and significant contributions to research for several reasons. First, the literature 
on decision biases and IT has focused almost exclusively on DSS which support decision makers. 
Considering the increasing number of opportunities where decision makers can delegate their decision 
making to IT, it is worthwhile to investigate the impact of these new information technologies on the 
proneness to decision biases. Second, the impact of IT on decision biases was hitherto analyzed only in 
experimental settings. This is the first study that extends these results to a real market setting. Third, there 
are only a few studies which analyze the effects of IT usage on decision biases, and none of these 
analyzed the sunk cost effect. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explore this issue. 
Fourth, there is only limited experimental and no field evidence for the sunk cost effect for behavioral 
investments. We show that the delegation of decision making to IT decreases proneness to the sunk cost 
effect. With this result, we provide first field evidence that behavioral investments affect proneness to the 
sunk cost effect. In summary, we provide new insights relevant to information systems and behavioral 
economics research that will benefit both practitioners and researchers.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Literature Review 
Two streams of research are relevant to our study. The first examines the effect of information 
technologies on different decision biases and tests if and how these technologies can alleviate these 
biases. The second stream analyzes the sunk cost effect in different laboratory and field settings. We 
discuss relevant work from both of these streams in the following paragraphs.  
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A growing body of experimental research has examined the effect of DSS on some human decision 
biases. These studies, in general, have found that DSS are an effective tool to alleviate decision biases in 
experimental setups. In particular, earlier studies have shown that such systems can alleviate the 
anchoring and adjustment bias (George et al. 2000, Hoch and Schkade 1996, Lau et al. 2009), the base 
rate bias (Hoch and Schkade 1996, Roy and Lerch 1996), the first impression bias (Lim et al. 2000), the 
familiarity bias (Marett and Adams 2006), the framing bias (Bhandari et al. 2008, Cheng and Wu 2010), 
the representativeness bias (Bhandari et al. 2008), and the ambiguity effect (Bhandari et al. 2008). To the 
best of our knowledge, there exists no study, which analyzes the effect of IT usage on the sunk cost effect. 
There are various approaches to alleviating decision biases. In his seminal work on debiasing, Fischhoff 
(1982) proposed a classification of these approaches based on the source of the decision bias. He 
identified faulty tasks, faulty decision makers, and mismatches between decision makers and tasks as 
potential sources. In case of faulty tasks, he proposed that the redesign of the task environment could 
debias the decision maker. When a faulty decision maker is the source of a decision bias, Fischhoff 
proposed an escalation design with four steps to debias the decision maker. The first step in this escalation 
design is to warn the decision maker about the possibility of bias. The second step is to describe the bias. 
The third step is to provide personalized feedback; and, the fourth is to train the decision maker 
extensively. As an alternative to this four-step approach, one may replace the decision maker in question. 
In case of a mismatch between the decision maker and the task, Fischhoff proposed to restructure the task 
in a way that the task and decision maker are as compatible as possible. Most of the extent studies 
restructured the task by modifying the presentation format (Bhandari et al. 2008, Hoch and Schkade 1996, 
Lau et al. 2009, Lim et al. 2000, Roy and Lerch 1996) or by providing further information (Marret and 
Adams 2006) and showed that this could debias the decision maker. Two other studies used warnings to 
debias the decision maker (Cheng and Wu 2010, George et al. 2000). We summarize this body of research 
in Table 1. 
Our study differs from the earlier work on IT usage and decision biases in three key ways. First, we 
analyze a new kind of IT that can help alleviate or even prevent decision biases. Compared to DSS, 
automated software agents are different in terms of both functionality and purpose. The main purpose of a 
DSS is to support a decision maker, while automated software agents act in place of their owners. As 
many researchers argue that the delegation of decision making can be an effective way to alleviate 
decision biases (e.g. Fischhoff 1982, Roy and Lerch 1996) and since automated software agents provide 
numerous promising opportunities to delegate decision making, such agents are an obvious tool to 
alleviate or even eliminate decision biases. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, none of the 
previous studies analyze the effect of automated software agents on decision biases. Second, we use data
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Table 1: Summary of Laboratory Experiments Studying IT and Decision Biases 
 Bias(es) Source(s) of Bias(es) Debiasing Technique 
Hoch and Schkade (1996) Anchoring and 
adjustment, base rate bias 
Faulty decision maker, 
mismatch between task 
and decision maker 
Modifying the 
presentation format 
Roy and Lerch (1996) Base rate bias Mismatch between task 
and decision maker 
Modifying the 
presentation format 
George et al. (2000) Anchoring and 
adjustment 
Faulty decision maker Warning 
Lim et al. (2000) First impression bias Faulty decision maker Modifying the 
presentation format 
Marett and Adams (2006) Familiarity bias Faulty decision maker Providing further 
information 
Bhandari et al. (2008) Framing bias, 
representativeness bias, 
ambiguity effect 
Faulty decision maker Modifying the 
presentation format 
Lau et al. (2009) Anchoring and 
adjustment  
Faulty decision maker Modifying the 
presentation format 
Cheng and Wu (2010) Representativeness bias Faulty decision maker Warning 
 
obtained from a real market situation. This allows us to extend the existing work on the effects of IT 
usage in an important way. All of the presented studies obtain their results from laboratory experiments. 
Therefore, it is an important issue to validate experimental results in field settings. Third, we study the 
impact of IT usage on the sunk cost effect. Although the sunk cost effect has important economic 
implications, it has not yet been analyzed in the context of IT usage and decision biases.  
The second relevant stream of literature for our research addresses the sunk cost effect. A large body of 
literature has analyzed this effect in laboratory and field settings. The sunk cost effect for monetary 
investments has been documented in the laboratory (e.g., Arkes and Blumer 1985, Friedman et al. 2007, 
Garland 1990, Staw 1976, Thaler and Johnson 1990) as well as in real market settings (e.g., Camerer and 
Weber 1999, Staw and Hoang 1995). With regard to purely behavioral investments, there is an absence of 
evidence from the field and only limited experimental evidence (Cunha and Caldieraro 2009, 2010, 
Navarro and Fantino 2009). Additionally, other scholars fail to replicate these experimental results (Otto 
2010) or argue that there is no sunk cost effect for a behavioral investment, such as time (Soman 2001).  
Our research differs from the prior studies on the sunk cost effect in two important ways. First, we are 
able to analyze the sunk cost effect for both monetary and behavioral investments in a real market setting. 
This gives us a unique advantage in terms of the generalizability of our results. Second, we provide not 
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only evidence for the existence of the sunk cost effect, but also show that IT can be an effective tool for 
alleviating this bias. Our results might help decision makers to overcome the sunk cost effect and, 
thereby, substantially increase the quality of their decisions.  
2.2. Hypotheses 
As stated in the introduction, the sunk cost effect is defined as “a greater tendency to continue an 
endeavor once an investment in money, time or effort has been made” (Arkes and Blumer 1985). Thaler 
(1980) provides the following example for this effect: “A family pays $40 for tickets to a basketball game 
to be played 60 miles from their home. On the day of the game there is a snowstorm. They decide to go 
anyway, but note in passing that had the tickets been given to them, they would have stayed home.” 
Standard economic theory predicts that, regardless of whether the family paid for the tickets or received 
them for free, this should not influence their decision to go to the game. Nevertheless, in this example, the 
family decides to attend the game because of their already sunk investments. Previous research 
demonstrated the sunk cost effect in several experimental and empirical settings. As is well known from 
this literature, higher monetary sunk costs increase the likelihood of the occurrence of the sunk cost effect 
(e.g., Arkes and Blumer 1985, Camerer and Weber 1999, Garland 1990, Staw and Hoang 1995). Arkes 
and Blumer (1985) provided funds for the Ohio University Theater to give randomly discounted season 
tickets to the first sixty customers. They found that the persons who got the smallest discount attended the 
most plays and that the number of plays attended decreased with increasing discount. In another 
experiment, they requested participants to decide whether they wanted to go on a skiing trip for which 
they had already paid $50 or on a skiing trip for which they had paid $100 but which they will enjoy less. 
In this experiment, the majority of the study participants decided to go on the $100 ski trip because of the 
higher sunk costs related to this trip. Similarly, Camerer and Weber (1999) as well as Staw and Hoang 
(1995) found that, after controlling for their performance, NBA players get more playing time the earlier 
they are picked in the draft. Being drafted ten places earlier – and thus incurring a higher sunk cost – 
increases the player’s playing time by approximately 200 minutes over the whole season. Garland (1990) 
demonstrated that willingness to authorize additional resources for a threatened research and development 
project was both positively and linearly related to the proportion of the budget that had already been 
spent. Based on these findings, we arrive at the following hypothesis.  
HYPOTHESIS 1: A higher monetary investment increases proneness to the sunk cost effect. 
Research into behavioral resource allocation has documented that people recognize time costs invested in 
cognitive tasks (Gray et al. 2006). Accordingly, behavioral investments like investments in effort, 
emotional attachment to a product, or time have been cited as another source for the sunk cost effect in 
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several studies (e.g., Cunha and Caldieraro 2009, 2010, Navarro and Fantino 2009). Cunha and Caldieraro 
(2009; 2010) manipulated the necessary effort and time to identify the best possible choice in a given set 
of alternatives. Subsequently, they added another alternative which strictly dominated the alternatives 
already presented. They find that participants in the high effort and time group were more likely to stick 
with the dominated alternative. Navarro and Fantino (2009) explore the sunk cost effect for behavioral 
investments using the example of time investments in four questionnaire studies and four behavioral 
experiments. Their results indicate that there is a consistent and robust sunk cost effect for time, if the 
individual has been responsible for the time investment. Based on these results, we have the following 
hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: A higher behavioral investment increases proneness to the sunk cost effect. 
The delegation of decision making to prevent humans from decision biases was first proposed by 
Fischhoff (1982). He suggested that, as a final debiasing solution, faulty decision makers should be 
replaced by a superior instance. Referring to the sunk cost effect, a decision maker can be replaced in two 
distinct decision situations: (1) when the monetary and behavioral investments are made, or (2) when the 
decision maker decides whether or not to continue the endeavor. In this work, we focus on the 
replacement of the decision maker in the first decision situation and analyze its impact on her subsequent 
decisions in the latter situation. Undoubtedly, the delegation of decision making can have no influence on 
the nominal value of monetary investments. For instance, there is no difference in the monetary 
investments if somebody spends $10 on her own or if she delegates the decision to someone else, who 
spends $10 on her behalf. In contrast to monetary investments, the delegation of decision making can 
protect decision makers from behavioral investments. For example, there is a substantial difference in the 
behavioral investment if somebody conducts a task on her own compared to delegating this task to 
someone else. Thus, the delegation of decision making should protect the decision maker from potential 
behavioral investments. Today, rapid technological developments have enabled the delegation of decision 
making to IT in a large number of situations. For example, decision makers can delegate their decision 
making to automated bidding agents in online auctions (Adomavicius et al. 2009) or use automated 
trading algorithms for transacting in financial markets (Hendershott et al. 2011). These agents are widely 
available at a negligible marginal cost and can effectively decide on behalf of their owners. Bapna (2003) 
states that such automated agents “are an obvious technology that could reduce bidding costs” where 
these bidding costs are conceptually akin to our behavioral investments. Therefore, we have the following 
hypothesis. 
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HYPOTHESIS 3: Delegating decision making to IT decreases behavioral investments and, thereby, 
reduces proneness to the sunk cost effect. 
We test our hypotheses on a unique and very rich dataset which we present in the following section. 
3. Research Setup 
3.1. Description of the Auction Mechanism 
The data for our study come from a large German website offering pay-per-bid auctions. Between August 
28, 2009 and May 9, 2010, 6,995 pay-per-bid auctions have been conducted on the website. Each such 
auction starts at a price of zero and with a fixed end time on a countdown clock. Auction participants are 
restricted to bidding a fixed bid increment (e.g., 1 cent) above the current bid and must pay a non-
refundable fixed fee (e.g., 50 cents) to place each bid. Each bid extends the duration of the auction by a 
given time increment (e.g., 10 seconds). For example, in an auction where the current bid is $2.32 with 12 
seconds on the auction countdown, an additional bid increases the current bid by 1 cent to $2.33 and 
extends the auction countdown by 10 seconds.4 The participant who places the bid has to pay the fixed 
bidding fee of 50 cents. A participant wins the auction if her bid is not followed by another bid. The 
winner has to pay the current bid (in addition to the bidding fees already paid) to obtain the item. If the 
participant in our example is the last bidder, she would win the auctioned product for $2.33. This auction 
mechanism induces that the majority of bidding occurs after the initial end time5 on the auction clock. For 
our website more than 98% of all bids were placed after the initial end time. 
A direct buy option allows participants who do not win the auction to directly buy the auctioned item for 
a buy-it-now price (known prior to the commencement of the auction) net of her aggregated bidding fees 
paid for the bids placed in the auction. In our example, this would mean that a participant who had not 
won the auction but had placed 20 bids could directly buy the auctioned product for the posted buy-it-now 
price net of $10, which is equal to 20 times the bidding fee of 50 cents. Please note that while there can 
only be one winner in each auction, there is no limit to the number of participants who can buy the 
product directly.  
We can easily transfer Thaler’s (1980) example for the sunk cost effect to pay-per-bid auctions with direct 
buy option. An auction participant invests $40 in bidding fees to acquire an iPhone in a pay-per-bid 
                                                     
4 The time increments linearly add up for each placed bid. For instance, if somebody places another bid during the same second 
the countdown extends by another 10 seconds to 32 seconds. 
5 The initial end time is set by the auction operator. It is the time at which an auction ends when nobody places a bid in this 
auction. With each placed bid, the initial end time is extended by the time increment. 
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auction. After failing to win the auction, she decides to exercise the buy-it-now option, but notes in 
passing that had she not invested any bidding fees, she would not have bought the iPhone for the buy-it-
now price net of the spent bidding fees at the auction website. 
Bid increments on the observed auction website are 0.01€ for 74%, 0.02€ for 15%, 0.05€ for 9% and 
0.10€ for 2% of the auctions. The bidding fee is constant at 0.50€ for each auction while the time 
increment varies between 10 and 20 seconds. More than 80% of the auctions include a direct buy option 
for participants who fail to win the auction. After an auction is completed, each unsuccessful auction 
participant receives an e-mail reminding her of the opportunity to directly buy the product. The posted 
buy-it-now price is on average 4.8% above the price posted on amazon.de at the respective end time of 
the auction. The average delivery time for the direct buy items is posted in the respective auction 
description. It is typically ten days after receipt of money.6  
One very important feature for our study is that participants have the opportunity to delegate their actual 
bidding to automated bidding agents. An agent places a predefined amount of bids autonomously. To 
setup such an agent, auction participants must specify the number of bids and a price interval (lower and 
upper limits) in which these bids should be placed. After the auction price exceeds the lower bound of the 
price interval, the bidding agent starts bidding. The agent places the bids at random points in time before 
the auction countdown is expired. It stops bidding (1) when the auction is won, (2) when the auction price 
exceeds the upper bound of the price interval, or (3) when the predetermined amount of bids is depleted. 
This bidding mechanism gives manual bidders a seemingly competitive advantage over the bidding agent. 
While manual bidders can wait until the very last moments of the auction, the bidding agent places its 
bids just at a random point in time before the auction countdown is expired. The comparison of the 
remaining seconds on the auction countdown shows that manual bidders place their bids on average 81 
seconds before the expiration of the auction countdown. In contrast, for bidding agents this timeframe on 
average amounts to 310 seconds. 
3.2. Dataset 
Our dataset contains customer level bidding and transaction data for all auctions conducted between 
August 28, 2009 and May 9, 2010. For each auction, we have information about the actual bidding 
behavior of each participant, the bidding method used (agent or manual bidding), the auctioned product, 
whether or not the auction included a direct buy option, and if it did, whether, when, and by whom this 
option was exercised, and the buy-it-now price. On the participants’ level, we know their date of 
                                                     
6 The comparably long delivery time is caused by the business model of our analyzed website. Only items that are auctioned are 
kept in stock. Additional items for participants who exercise the direct buy option are ordered after the receipt of money.  
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registration, the number of bought bids as well as some demographics like gender and age. It is this level 
of detail that gives our field research a significant advantage over other studies of online pay-per-bid 
auctions (e.g., Augenblick 2010, Byers et al. 2010, Platt et. al 2012) where the data are restricted to direct 
observations on the websites offering such auctions. Overall, we have data for 483,414 auction 
participations by 87,038 distinct participants. These participants placed 6,463,642 bids in 6,995 auctions 
for 408 different products. Of these auctions, 5,763 included an option to directly buy the product. The 
direct buy option was exercised 6,337 times by 2,584 distinct participants.  
3.3. Study Design 
In an ideal empirical setting, we would have data about each auction participant’s private valuation of the 
auctioned product. This would allow us to directly observe if an auction participant executed the direct 
buy option due to irrationality, or just because her valuation of the product is higher than the buy-it-now 
price net of her spent bidding fees (we call this price the individual direct buy price in the following). For 
example, consider an auction participant who invested $40 in an auction with a buy-it-now price of $800. 
If this person’s valuation for the product is above $760 and there is no other comparable (or better) 
retailer offering the product for a lower price, it is a rational decision to exercise the direct buy option 
after having participated in the auction. Conversely, if the valuation for the product is below $760, the 
direct buy decision is always attributable to irrationality. Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly 
observe this valuation in a non-experimental setting.  
However, in line with Malmendier and Lee (2011), by utilizing publicly available price information from 
competing retailers, it is possible to determine a very conservative threshold for the direct buy decision 
scenarios that are attributable to irrationality. If the publicly available price at a comparable (or better) 
retailer is lower than the individual direct buy price, a direct buy decision by this participant can be 
attributed to irrationality. In this case, the participant’s valuation for the product can be either higher or 
lower than the low price at the competing website. If the valuation is lower than this price, it is always 
irrational to buy the product. If the valuation is higher than the low price at the competing retailer, a 
rational auction participant would always buy the auctioned product for the lower price at the competing 
website.7  
We were able to collect prices posted on amazon.de for 3,021 auctions. These prices are on average 4.8% 
lower than the buy-it-now price on the auction website. Given the widespread price dispersion online 
                                                     
7 Many bloggers and news articles suggest (e.g., Diaz 2009, Thaler 2009) that most participants of these types of auctions are 
deal seekers and are quite price sensitive. Accordingly, such participants are naturally quite likely to use a price comparison site 
to find a low price. 
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(Clemons et al. 2002) and the trend of higher prices being charged by reputable retailers (Smith and 
Brynjolfsson 2001), the posted buy-it-now price is usually much higher than the lowest price available 
online. Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) as well as Clay et al. (2002) find that buyers are willing to pay a 
premium of approximately 10% to buy from amazon.com instead of a different, less reputable retailer 
with a similar offering. In addition, prior research suggests that shipment conditions and delivery times 
play an important role in determining a consumer’s willingness to pay (Pan et al. 2002). Considering both 
the retailer’s reputation and the delivery times, Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) state that the majority of 
customers in their sample chose an offer that is 20.4% higher than the cheapest offer.  
Given the relatively longer delivery times and the low reputation of the website we analyze, it is very 
unlikely that auction participants consider their individual direct buy price to be equally comparable to 
amazon’s posted price.8 Rather, participants are willing to pay a substantial premium to buy from 
amazon.de (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001) and compare their individual direct buy prices with low prices 
from other retailers which are better comparable in terms of reputation and delivery times. Fortunately, 
the sourcing prices of the directly bought items, which the operators of the website made available to us, 
give us a good estimate for these low prices. As the company did not keep items in stock but directly 
ordered the sold items, after receiving the payment, from different online retailers, the sourcing prices are 
– at the minimum – representative of low prices available online. In addition, the company restricted their 
sourcing to a few key online retailers. Thus, there may have been even lower prices available. Consistent 
with the findings from prior research, the observed sourcing prices are on average 12.9% lower than 
respective prices posted on amazon.de. Accordingly, we identify a decision scenario as irrational if a 
participant’s individual direct buy price is higher than the company’s sourcing price of the respective 
product.9  
3.4. Main Variables 
Our research design allows us to analyze the effects of monetary and behavioral investments on irrational 
decisions made with regards to the direct buy option. We measure the monetary investment by a variable 
named Sum of Bids which is equal to the number of bids a participant placed in a specific auction. As 
participants have to pay a fixed bidding fee for each bid placed, this variable is a reliable measure for a 
participant’s monetary investment.  
                                                     
8 From the launch day of the website until the end of our observations period, the website sold only 6,337 units which leaves no 
room for building up any reputation. Additionally, the pay-per-bid auction format was met with controversy in online discussions 
and in the media. For example, a famous blogger called the business model “…as close to pure, distilled evil in a business plan 
as I’ve ever seen.” These discussions might also have a negative impact on the company’s reputation. 
9 In the robustness checks section, we consider alternative thresholds for such scenarios. 
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We identified three major sources of behavioral investments in pay-per-bid auctions:  (1) the necessary 
investment in time and effort to participate in the auction, (2) the quasi endowment effect, and (3) the 
very high degree of competition in this auction format. First, there is no certainty about the end time of an 
auction since the duration extends with each bid placed. Therefore, participants need to monitor auctions 
very closely and invest a substantial amount of time and effort in their participation. Second, each time a 
participant places a bid, she is the highest bidder for at least a very short period of time. Even without a 
legal claim on the item, a bidder might develop a feeling of ownership of the item during this period 
(Heyman et al. 2004). This so-called ‘quasi-endowment effect’ further increases a participant’s behavioral 
investment. Third, the auction mechanism in pay-per-bid auctions typically leads to a very high degree of 
competition among auction participants (Byers et al. 2010). In contrast to an eBay-type auction, failing to 
win a pay-per-bid auction not only leads to missing out on the item but also to the loss of the bidding fees 
already incurred. This suggests that the comparably higher level of competition in pay-per-bid auctions 
constitutes an additional increase in the participant’s behavioral investment (for a discussion of the effect 
of competition on bidding behavior, see Heyman et al. 2004). Naturally, all of these sources of behavioral 
investments are closely related to the number of placed bids. Thus, Sum of Bids is also indicative of 
behavioral investments.  
To separate the effects of behavioral investments from the effects of monetary investments, we include a 
variable named Bid Agent Dummy, as well as the interaction of Sum of Bids and Bid Agent Dummy in our 
model. Bid Agent Dummy equals one if a participant placed more than 75% of her bids in a specific 
auction using an automated bidding agent.10 Holding the number of placed bids constant, the usage of an 
automated bidding agent cannot have any influence on a participant’s monetary investment. Thus, the 
interaction of Sum of Bids and Bid Agent Dummy must capture any potential difference between the 
behavioral investment of a manual bidder and the behavioral investment of an agent owner. However, 
setting up an automated bidding agent may also induce some behavioral investments. These investments 
are captured by the variable Bid Agent Dummy. 
To account for potential time-varying heterogeneity across auction participants, we include the variable 
Number of Participations as a historical experience measure in our model. This variable is defined as the 
number of participations by a specific participant in different auctions since the day of registration. Such 
experience measures are widely used to control for consumer heterogeneity in both marketing literature 
and industry practices (Anderson and Simester 2004, De et al. 2010).  
                                                     
10 In the robustness checks section, we apply more strict definitions of agent usage. 
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As the economics and marketing literatures suggest, people evaluate potential savings not only in an 
absolute way, but also by assessing their savings in relation to the absolute price of a product (e.g., 
Grewal and Marmorstein 1994). For example, a $5 discount for a product with a price of $10 is valued 
higher than the same discount for a product worth $1,000. To control for this issue, we include a variable 
named Buy-it-Now Price in our model. It is defined as the posted buy-it-now price of each product and is 
measured in Euro.   
‘Late bidding’ is a common phenomenon in online auctions like eBay (Roth and Ockenfels 2002). The 
auction mechanism in pay-per-bid auctions further intensifies this effect. Pay-per-bid auctions are not 
simply won by the bidder with the highest monetary investment, but by the bidder who placed the last bid 
before the auction countdown expires. Thus, it is crucial for bidders – if they do not use an automated 
bidding agent – to closely track the auction to the very end. Since the auction mechanism is designed in 
such a way that bidders have no information about the ultimate end time when they enter the auction, 
there might be an effect of the end time influencing the decision to directly buy a product, e.g., a bidder 
might evaluate her behavioral investment differently if she expected the auction to end before midnight, 
but continues bidding if the auction takes longer. Therefore, we divide the day into two 12 hour intervals, 
starting at midnight, and include one dummy variable (Midnight - Noon Dummy) to control for the end 
time of the auction. The definition of all the variables can be found in Table 2.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Basic Model 
The occurrence of the sunk cost effect is represented by a binary variable equaling one, if the direct buy 
option is exercised in an irrational decision scenario. Accordingly, we use a logistic panel regression 
model to examine the impact of bidding agent usage on the proneness to the sunk cost effect. In addition 
to some other benefits, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to control for the individual 
heterogeneity of auction participants (Hsiao 2003). To utilize this advantage, we can estimate both fixed 
and random effects models (for a general discussion of when to use fixed or random effects models, see 
Hsiao 2003). An important advantage of the fixed effects model is that it allows for the individual specific 
effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables. For the random effects model, such correlation is 
not allowed (Hsiao 2003). This advantage of the fixed effects model comes along with the disadvantage 
that this model completely ignores the between-person variations. This often yields standard errors that 
are considerably higher than those produced by methods considering both within- and between-person 
variations (Allison 2005). However, for our dataset, we expect that the individual specific effects can be
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Table 2: Definition of Variables 
Name of Variable Definition 
Direct Buy Dummy variable which indicates if a participant 
exercised the direct buy option in the respective auction. 
Sum of Bids Number of bids placed by a participant in the respective 
auction. 
Bid Agent Dummy Dummy variable which indicates if a participant placed 
more than 75% with one of the two bidding methods in a 
specific auction.  
Number of Participations The participant’s number of auction participations 
before the start time of the respective auction. 
Buy-it-Now Price  Price for which a participant could buy the auctioned 
product without having placed a bid in the respective 
auction. 
Midnight - Noon Dummy Dummy variable which indicates if an auction ended 
between midnight and noon of the next day. 
Number of Wins The participant’s number of wins before the start time of 
the respective auction. 
Number of Direct Buys The participant’s number of direct buys before the start 
time of the respective auction. 
Days since Last Participation The number of days since a participant’s last auction 
participation. 
Sum of Bids Last Auction The number of bids a participant placed during her last 
auction participation. 
Gender  The participant’s gender. Takes the value one if female. 
Age  The participant’s age. 
Former Experience Bidding Agent Dummy Dummy variable to indicate a participant’s former 
experience with the bidding agent. 
 
correlated with the explanatory variables. For example, a person with a higher unobservable risk 
preference may spend more bids while participating in a pay-per-bid auction.  
Accordingly, we estimate a fixed effects logistic regression model to test for a direct effect of monetary as 
well as behavioral sunk costs on irrational decisions to directly buy a product and, more importantly, for a 
potential effect of IT usage on this relationship. We include the variables Sum of Bids and Bid Agent 
Dummy as well as their interaction in our model. We further add the control variables presented in the 
preceding subsection. Thus, we consider the following model in latent variable form (Wooldridge 2010): 
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     , 
(1) 
    is a dummy variable equaling one if a participant i exercises the direct buy option in auction j;      
denotes the sum of bids a participant placed in an auction;      is a dummy variable indicating if a 
participant i uses an automated bidding agent in auction j;    is a set of dummy variables indicating 
individual fixed effects;     is a vector of control variables; and     is the random error term.  
Note that this model specification controls for all the time invariant factors, including any differences that 
are inherent among participants, e.g., risk attitude, ability to use bidding agents, and intellectual capacity.  
More importantly, the individual fixed effects along with the time variant participant specific variable, 
Number of Participations, collectively addresses concerns regarding self-selection of participants who use 
an automated bidding agent. Thus, the fixed effects model allows us to address endogeneity concerns in a 
meaningful and robust manner (Allison 2005). 
4.2. Sample 
To isolate the impact of IT usage on the sunk cost effect, we restrict the data to instances where auction 
participants in a specific auction placed more than 75% of their bids either with or without an automated 
bidding agent. We further drop all observations where the respective auction does not include a direct buy 
option or where the respective participant won the auction.  As the conditional fixed effects model 
requires variation in the independent variable (Wooldridge 2010), we restrict our sample to individuals 
who participated at least twice and executed the direct buy option at least once but not in each of their 
participations.11 This leaves us with a sample of 230 distinct individuals who participated on average 14 
times and, thereby, faced 3,153 irrational decision scenarios. In these situations the direct buy option was 
executed 240 times. In other words, our sample is an unbalanced panel data consisting of 230 individuals 
and 3,153 observations. Table 3 lists summary statistics for this sample. 
4.3. Main Results 
Our first hypothesis is supported if we find a significantly positive coefficient for the variable Sum of 
Bids. This would mean that irrational direct buy decisions do not just occur randomly; but that a 
participant’s monetary investment has a significant positive effect on this event. This specification exactly 
matches the definition of the sunk cost effect. However, a positive coefficient for Sum of Bids does not
                                                     
11 The significant test statistic (85.02) in favor of the fixed effects model for the Hausman (1978) specification test 
supports our model choice. Nevertheless, the results remain qualitatively unchanged if we estimate a random effects 
model where no such restriction is imposed. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75 Percentile Max 
Direct Buy 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 1 
Sum of Bids 13.81 32.19 1 3 11 501 
Bid Agent Dummy 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 1 
Number of Participations 44.95 77.73 2 13 50 444 
Buy-it-Now Price (in €) 364.22 319.47 129.97 236.58 579.00 1,336.99 
Midnight - Noon Dummy 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 1 
 
automatically imply support for our second hypothesis as the effects of behavioral investments cannot be 
directly discerned from the nominal value of this variable. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are only supported if the 
interaction of Sum of Bids and Bid Agent Dummy has a significant negative effect on the decision to 
directly buy a product. A significant negative effect of this interaction term would imply that, depending 
on the bidding technology used, there is a significant difference between the sum of monetary and 
behavioral investments. As the monetary investments are the same, irrespective of which bidding method 
is used, different behavioral investments are the only possible explanation for this effect. This would 
imply both a positive effect of behavioral investments on the occurrence of irrational direct buy decisions 
and a negative effect of IT usage on this relationship.   
Table 4 presents the estimates of the fixed effect model. Confirming our first hypothesis, we find a very 
strong and highly significant positive relationship between the number of bids placed and the likelihood 
to exercise the direct buy option. Consistent with hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3, the coefficient for the 
interaction of Sum of Bids and Bid Agent Dummy is negative and highly significant.  
4.4. Economic Significance of Main Results 
As we estimate a logistic regression model, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as the change in the 
mean of     for a one unit increase in the respective predictor variable, with all other predictors remaining 
constant.12 Rather, they can be interpreted as the natural logarithm of a multiplying factor by which the 
predicted odds of       change, given a one unit increase in the predictor variable, holding all other 
                                                     
12 This applies especially to interaction effects in logit (and other non-linear) models. In such models, the magnitude of the 
interaction effect does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term and can even be of opposite sign (Ai and Norton 
2003). However, it is unproblematic to interpret these interaction effects using multiplicative effects like odds ratios (Buis 2010). 
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Table 4: Main Results  
Variable  
Sum of Bids 
0.0937*** 
(0.0078) 
Bid Agent Dummy 
0.9883*** 
(0.3773) 
Sum of Bids * Bid Agent Dummy 
-0.0468*** 
(0.0071) 
Number of Participations 
0.0114* 
(0.0065) 
Buy-it-Now Price 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0009) 
Midnight – Noon Dummy 
0.2144 
(0.2554) 
Log likelihood -192.52 
Number of observations 3,153 
Number of participants 230 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
  
predictor variables constant.13 Therefore, we first have to calculate the odds ratio, which is equal to the 
exponent of the coefficient of the respective variable. 
Table 4 shows that the coefficient associated with Sum of Bids is 0.0937. Thus the odds ratio for this 
variable is equal to exp(0.0937) = 1.0982. Because Sum of Bids is part of the interaction term (Sum of 
Bids * Bid Agent Dummy), the coefficient does not represent a main effect but instead represents a 
conditional effect, i.e., the effect of a one unit increase of Sum of Bids when the moderator variable is zero 
(Jaccard 2001). Thus, 1.0982 is the multiplying factor by which the odds of buying the product directly 
changes for each additionally placed bid for participants who do not use an automated bidding agent. To 
put it differently, the odds for buying the product directly increases by about 10% for each additional 
manually placed bid.  
Next, we want to assess the effect of Sum of Bids on the odds of buying the product directly when a 
participant uses an automated bidding agent. Here, we need to take the exponent of the sum of the 
coefficients of Sum of Bids and the interaction term (Sum of Bids * Bid Agent Dummy). The resulting odds 
ratio is 1.0480, implying that a one unit increase in Sum of Bids increases the odds of directly buying the 
product by 5%. This is only 50% of the increase for participants who do not use an automated bidding 
                                                     
13 The odds are defined as Odds  
 (     )
(   (     ))
. 
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Figure 1: Odds Ratio as a Function of Sum of Bids
 
agent. For example, consider a participant who placed 67 bids in an auction.14 If this participant had 
placed her bids manually, the odds of buying the product directly are approximately 533 times higher than 
if she had not placed any bid. Conversely, if this participant has placed her bids via an automated bidding 
agent, her odds are only 23 times higher than if she had not placed any bid. This result strongly supports 
our hypotheses 2 and 3. 
In addition to the indirect effect, there is also a direct effect of Bid Agent Dummy on the proneness to the 
sunk cost effect. To assess this effect, we need to take the exponent of the coefficient of Bid Agent 
Dummy. The resulting odds ratio is 2.6867. This odds ratio implies that the base odds of buying the 
product directly must be multiplied by 2.6867 if a participant switches from manual bidding to using an 
automated bidding agent.  
To analyze the total effect of bidding agent usage on the likelihood to exercise the direct buy option, we 
need to combine the effects of Sum of Bids and Bid Agent Dummy for participants who use an automated 
bidding agent and compare this combined effect with the effect of Sum of Bids for manual bidders. 
                                                     
14 This is equal to the average number of bids placed by a participant who exercised the option to directly buy the product. 
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Table 5: Summary of Results 
Hypothesis Result 
H1:  A higher monetary investment increases proneness to the sunk cost effect. Supported 
H2:  A higher behavioral investment increases proneness to the sunk cost effect. Supported 
H3:  IT usage decreases behavioral investments and, thereby, reduces proneness 
to the sunk cost effect. 
Supported 
 
Figure 1 shows the resulting odds ratios for participants who use an automated bidding agent and for 
manual bidders.15 We see a positive effect of bidding agent usage on the likelihood to exercise the direct 
buy option for the first 21 bids. If we continue the example from the last paragraph and consider a 
participant who placed 67 bids using an automated bidding agent, her odds are 62 times higher than if she 
had not placed any bid. If this participant placed her bids manually, her odds are still 533 times higher 
than if she had not placed any bid.  
The positive effect for the first 21 bids can be attributed to the average fixed behavioral investments 
necessary to set up an automated bidding agent. This finding gives us additional support for our second 
hypothesis but is seemingly contrary to our third hypothesis. But a closer look reveals that the average 
predicted probability of exercising the direct buy option for participants who placed less than 22 bids with 
an automated bidding agent is 1.3%. Therefore, the positive effect of bidding agent usage on the 
likelihood to exercise the direct buy option is negligible. In contrast, for the participants who placed more 
than 21 bids with an automated bidding agent, the total effect of bidding agent usage is always negative as 
stated by our third hypothesis. Table 5 summarizes these results. 
Our research design allows us to quantify the difference of the behavioral investments of agent users and 
manual bidders in monetary value. For each number of manually placed bids, we can easily find the 
respective amount of bids an agent user needs to place to have a similar odds ratio. The difference 
between these two numbers multiplied by the bidding fee is equal to the monetary value of the disparity 
of the behavioral investment if the respective participant made use of an automated bidding agent. Figure 
2 shows this difference (solid line) as well as the ratio of this difference and a participant’s total 
investment (dashed line) as a function of the number of placed bids. We see from Figure 2 that the 
behavioral investment of a manual bidder who placed 67 bids (which is equal to a monetary investment of 
33.5€) has a monetary value of 22.5€. So, for such a bidder, the behavioral investments sum up to 
                                                     
15 Note that the y-axis has a logarithmic scale. 
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Figure 2: Monetary Valuation of Behavioral Investments 
 
approximately 40% of her total investments. With increasing number of placed bids the ratio between the 
monetary value of the behavioral investment and the total investment approaches to 50%.  
5. Robustness Checks  
Although our main results confirm our hypotheses, we have examined a number of competing 
explanations for the observed effects. In the following, we demonstrate that our results survive a wide 
range of robustness checks. 
5.1. Quality of External Price 
One may argue that the company’s sourcing price is not a perfect estimate for the reference price of 
auction participants. Even though the website we analyze has no reputation and comparably long delivery 
times, there may be participants who have a preference for buying at our auction website. Therefore, these 
participants do not compare their individual direct buy price with a low price available online, but with a 
price from – in their view – a more comparable retailer. In addition, even if it is an empirically well-
founded assumption, we do not exactly know if the customers are aware of the low price. If the customers 
are only aware of prices higher than the companies sourcing price or if the customers are willing to pay a 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
22 72 122 172 222 272 322 372 422 472
Sum of Bids 
Monetary value of the difference between behavioral investments of
agent user and manual bidder (left axis)
Ratio of the monetary value of the difference between behavioral
investments of agent user and manual bidder and monetary
investment (right axis)
21 
 
premium to buy at our analyzed website, we would potentially misidentify some rational direct buy 
decisions as irrational. Furthermore, there may be also some costs associated with switching from our 
auction website to a retailer offering the low price. If these switching costs are higher than the difference 
between the low price and the individual direct buy price, the respective direct buy decisions cannot be 
attributed to irrationality. We can address these concerns by increasing our estimate for a low price 
available online. Accordingly, we re-estimate our main model on datasets where we stepwise raise the 
threshold where we identify a decision scenario as irrational. In the first step, we look only at participants 
who face decision scenarios where their individual direct buy price was above 105% of the companies 
sourcing price. Subsequently, we increase this threshold value to 110% of the sourcing price.  As a very 
strict robustness check, we compare a participant’s individual direct buy price with the price posted on 
amazon.de at the end time of the auction.16 For this robustness check, we identify only those decision 
scenarios as irrational where the individual direct buy price was higher than the respective price posted on 
amazon.de. This is a very strict robustness check as it assumes that participants have no additional 
willingness to pay to buy at a reputable retailer or to get a shorter delivery time. These assumptions are in 
direct contradiction to the empirical results of prior research (e.g., Clay et al. 2002, Smith and 
Brynjolfsson 2001). We present the results of these robustness checks in columns one to three of Table 6. 
Reassuringly, our main coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged. These results reaffirm our key 
findings and show that the results from our main model are not biased due to a wrong estimate of a low 
price available online. 
5.2. Self-Selection Arising from Bidding Agent Usage 
As mentioned before, the fixed effects model can be quite effective in addressing potential self-selection 
issues; still, we can further verify the robustness of our results by utilizing the propensity score matching 
method suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).17 This method is commonly used to control for self-
selection effects due to individual specific time variant and time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For 
example, this approach considers the impact of familiarity or experience with the auction platform on 
bidding agent usage and the sunk cost effect – that is controlled for in the fixed effects model through the 
variable Number of Participations – in a different way. Its basic idea is to find a sample of the control 
group (i.e., participants who do not use the automated bidding agent) that is similar to the treatment group 
(i.e., participants who use an automated bidding agent) in all relevant pretreatment characteristics. When 
                                                     
16 Note that this approach is equivalent to considering switching costs of 5%, 10% and 12.9% of the buy-it-now price. 
17 We have used the STATA PSMATCH2 module by Leuven and Sianesi (2009) to implement propensity score matching. 
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Table 6: Results with Consideration of Higher External Prices 
Variable 
105%  Sourcing 
Price 
110% Sourcing 
Price 
Amazon Price 
Sum of Bids 
0.0966*** 0.1004*** 0.1693*** 
(0.0097) (0.0126) (0.0462) 
Bid Agent Dummy 
1.2794*** 1.3758*** -0.7218 
(0.4315) (0.4917) (1.1421) 
Sum of Bids * Bid Agent Dummy 
-0.0590*** -0.0677*** -0.0706* 
(0.0095) (0.0129) (0.0366) 
Number of Participations 
0.0293** 0.0238* -0.0057 
(0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0254) 
Buy-it-Now Price 
-0.0058*** -0.0049*** -0.0100** 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0048) 
Midnight – Noon Dummy 
-0.0234 0.1969 -1.1495 
(0.2916) (0.3224) (1.1241) 
Log likelihood -142.14 -111.15 -21.07 
Number of observations 1,770 1,186 236 
Number of participants 165 119 50 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
  
this is done, the difference in outcomes for both groups can be attributed solely to the treatment rather 
than to self-selection effects. 
We use the variable Bid Agent Dummy to indicate whether an observation belongs to the treatment or to 
the control group. Then, in order to calculate the propensity score for each observation, we estimate a 
logit model with Bid Agent Dummy as dependent variable and variables measuring participants’ 
experience with the auction website (Number of Participations, Number of Wins, and Number of Direct 
Buys, Days since Last Participation), participants’ behavior in the last auction (Sum of Bids Last 
Auction), participants’ Gender and Age, and participants’ technology affinity (Former Experience 
Bidding Agent Dummy).18 Subsequently, to create an appropriate control group, we use caliper matching 
without replacement to match each treated observation to its nearest untreated neighbor based on the 
propensity score. The violation of the common support condition is a major source of evaluation bias in 
matching studies (Heckman et al. 1997). Accordingly, we restrict the maximal difference of the 
propensity scores of a treated and an untreated individual to 0.01. This approach ensures that we only 
match observations where the common support condition is not violated (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
We find that before matching, the control group is significantly different from the treatment group on 
dimensions such as experience with the auction website or technology affinity. However, after matching, 
                                                     
18 Definitions for all of these variables can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 7: Results for Propensity Score Matching and Product Category Dummies 
Variable 
Propensity Score 
Matching 
Product Category 
Dummies 
Sum of Bids 
0.0971*** 0.0928*** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0078) 
Bid Agent Dummy 
1.563*** 0.9585** 
 
(0.496) (0.3775) 
Sum of Bids * Bid Agent Dummy 
-0.0514*** -0.0461*** 
 
(0.0146) (0.0072) 
Number of Participations 
-0.0193*** 0.0109 
 
(0.00455) (0.0067) 
Buy-it-Now Price 
-0.0064*** -0.0073*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0009) 
Midnight – Noon Dummy 
0.249 0.2494 
(0.326) (0.2587) 
Computers Dummy 
 -0.5414 
 
 (0.4284) 
Others Dummy 
 0.0464 
 
 (0.3194) 
Videogames Dummy 
 0.2725 
 
 (0.2945) 
Intercept 
-2.884***  
(0.472)  
Log likelihood -158.68 -190.94 
Number of observations 1,028 3,153 
Number of participants 173 230 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
the difference between the matched control group and the treatment group is insignificant on all the 
dimensions. 
As the treatment and control groups do not differ significantly in all pre-treatment characteristics, we can 
use both, within- and between-person variation to estimate our model for this robustness check. 
Accordingly, we estimate our model in random effects specification for this matched sample. The results 
presented in the first column of Table 7 are very similar to those in Table 4. As in our main analysis, the 
coefficient for the variable Sum of Bids is positive and highly significant while the coefficient for the 
interaction term of Sum of Bids and Bid Agent Dummy is negative and highly significant. These results 
reinforce our confidence in our results not being biased through the self-selection of participants using an 
automated bidding agent.  
5.3. Considering Product Category Specific Effects 
One may argue that there are product category specific effects that influence our results. For example, in a 
recent study of pay-per-bid auctions, Platt et al. (2012) find deviating bidding behavior for products from 
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the category videogames in their dataset. These effects may not be completely captured by the variable 
Buy-it-Now Price. We address this issue by assigning each product to one of four product categories 
(home electronics, computers, others, and videogames) and include dummy variables for three of these 
categories in our model (Computers Dummy, Others Dummy, Videogames Dummy). The second column 
in Table 7 shows that our results remain qualitatively unchanged for this robustness check. 
5.4 Nonparametric Matching Model 
An additional way to rule out alternative explanations, as well as to further assess the robustness of our 
main results, is to follow Pope and Schweitzer (2011) and conduct nonparametric analyses. Although we 
lose some statistical power with this approach, it enables us to compare agent users and manual bidders in 
a novel way. Like Pope and Schweitzer (2011), we consider a matching model to compare participations 
with and without automated bidding agent usage where participants placed the same number of bids for 
the same product. As a first step, we create a list of irrational decision scenarios where the respective 
participant placed her bids using an automated bidding agent. Next, we use a matching algorithm to 
identify irrational decision scenarios where the respective participant placed the same number of bids for 
exactly the same product manually. For some scenarios we do not find any exact match, while for other 
irrational decision scenarios we find more than one exact match. In the first case, we do not include this 
scenario into our analysis. In the latter case, we include each matched pair into our analysis.19  
We report results from our matched analysis in Table 8. The first column shows the 238,569 pairs of 
irrational decision scenarios with and without automated bidding agent where we could find an exact 
match for the sum of placed bids for the same product across auctions. Consistent with our hypotheses 
and our parametric results, for the same number of placed bids for the same product, the direct buy option 
is executed significantly more often in irrational decision scenarios where bids are placed manually 
(0.0541% of the participations versus 0.0117% of the participations, p < 0.001). In columns two and 
three, we report results from pairs of irrational decision scenarios with and without automated bidding 
agent where the number of placed bids differ by 5% and 10%, respectively. With larger differences in the 
number of placed bids, we increase the count of matched pairs, but of course, these matches are less 
precise. We find that manual bidders exercise the direct buy option four and three times, respectively, 
more often than participants who use an automated bidding agent. Imposing an additional restriction that 
we only match decision scenarios where the respective participant placed the same number of bids for the 
                                                     
19 Consider the following example: We identify an irrational decision scenario where a participant places 10 bids for a specific 
product with an automated bidding agent. For the same product across different auctions, we find 5 irrational decision scenarios 
where participants also place 10 bids manually. This results in 5 matched pairs (the automated bidding agent scenario matched to 
each of the manually bidding scenarios).  
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Table 8: Nonparametric Matched Sample Analysis 
 
Maximum difference in the number of placed 
bids for the same product between matched 
irrational decision scenarios with and without 
bidding agent across auctions 
Maximum difference in the number of placed 
bids for the same product in the same auction 
between matched irrational decision scenarios 
with and without bidding agent 
 Exact match ≤ 5% ≤ 10% Exact match ≤ 5% ≤ 10% 
Fraction of executed direct buy options 
(automated bidding agent) 
0.0117% 
(1.0833%) 
0.0053% 
(0.7280%) 
0.0096% 
(0.9778%) 
0.0031% 
(0.5601%) 
0.0045% 
(0.6672%) 
0.0106% 
(1.0275%) 
Fraction of executed direct buy options 
(manual bidding) 
0.0541% 
(2.3247%) 
0.0221% 
(1.4876%) 
0.0282% 
(1.6802%) 
0.0230% 
(1.5166%) 
0.0298% 
(1.7268%) 
0.0392% 
(1.9826%) 
Average number of placed bids 
(automated bidding agent)  
4.8359 
(8.9542) 
5.2359 
(7.4805) 
6.8607 
(9.2563) 
4.8898 
(5.9406) 
5.8543 
(8.4688) 
7.6568 
(10.1796) 
Average number of placed bids  
(manual bidding) 
4.8359 
(8.9542) 
5.2319 
(7.4540) 
6.8134 
(9.1907) 
4.8898 
(5.9406) 
5.8504 
(8.4607) 
7.5980 
(10.1168) 
Number of pairs 238,569 6,829,613 8,095,428 95,630 224,633 274,653 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
same product in the same auction, we emulate the first column in column four of Table 8. Applying the 
same restriction, we emulate columns two and three in columns five and six of Table 8. Reassuringly, we 
find that manual bidders exercise the direct buy option between four and seven times more often than 
participants who use an automated bidding agent. Overall, the nonparametric results qualitatively echo the 
results obtained from the main model.  
5.5. Additional Robustness Checks 
We conduct a wide range of further robustness checks and find qualitatively similar results.20 First, there 
might be concerns that some participants do not have enough knowledge of the pay-per-bid auction 
mechanism when participating for the first time. In particular, some participants may not really 
understand the mechanism of the direct buy option, although all relevant information is publicly available 
before the auction starts. To address this issue, we drop each observation with no prior auction 
participation from our dataset and re-estimate our regression models on the resulting subsample. Second, 
we use more precise controls for the end time of the auction. We split the day into four six hour intervals 
and include three dummy variables controlling for the end time of an auction into our model. Third, we 
use more strict definitions for the usage of an automated bidding agent. In the first step we only include 
observations where more than 90% of the bids were placed with one of the two bidding methods. In the 
second step, we increase this threshold to 100%. Fourth, there might be additional concerns that buyers 
might know about the lower price, but stick with our website because of some potential switching costs. 
One may argue that these costs are not a percentage of the product value, but a fixed nominal amount. We 
                                                     
20 The results of these robustness checks are available upon request. 
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address this issue by including only those observations in our sample where the difference between the 
price on our website and the reference price was above 5€. Finally, all of our results are robust to random 
effects specifications (probit and logit) and linear probability model specifications (random and fixed 
effects) as well. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The advent of electronic markets has largely increased people’s opportunities to delegate their decision 
making to IT. Intelligent bidding agents on auction platforms (Adomavicius et al. 2009) or algorithms 
making their own decisions when trading on financial markets (Hendershott et al. 2011) are only a few 
examples for these opportunities. It is surprising, then, that there has not been any empirical research to 
date on how this delegation might affect human decision making and, especially, how it might influence 
critical human decision biases. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. Our analysis shows 
that participants’ IT usage has a significant impact on their proneness to a critical human decision bias – 
the sunk cost effect. More specifically, participants who delegate parts of their decisions to an automated 
bidding agent are far less prone to this bias. In economic terms, delegation to IT reduces the impact of 
overall investments on the sunk cost effect by 50%.  This result can be attributed to the comparably lower 
behavioral investments for participants who place their bids using an automated bidding agent.  
With this finding, we contribute also to the literature on the sunk cost effect. We are the first to observe 
both monetary and behavioral investments in a real market setting and to analyze their respective and 
relative roles on the sunk cost effect. Our findings support the lab experiments of Cunha and Caldieraro 
(2009, 2010) who stated that even purely behavioral sunk costs can induce the sunk cost effect. In 
addition, our findings could also help explain why people often overbid in online auctions (Malmendier 
and Lee 2011). Ariely and Simonson (2003) found that participants in 494 out of 500 eBay-type online 
auctions paid a higher price for the auctioned item than the price found on some online retailers’ websites. 
One explanation for this observation could be that auction participants who invested a substantial amount 
of time and effort in their participation are overbidding because they prefer to win the auctioned item for a 
slightly higher price compared with realizing the loss of all of their behavioral investments.  
Most importantly, our findings are a first step towards generalizing the earlier works on the effect of IT 
usage on decision biases to real market situations. Our results show that IT can alleviate the sunk cost 
effect in a real market situation. However, our work is just a first step in this generalization process. 
Further research is needed to examine if IT can also alleviate or even eliminate other decision biases in 
real market situations.  
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The findings in this paper are robust and have survived a wide range of robustness checks. The data 
analyzed in our paper were provided directly by a website offering pay-per-bid auctions. Therefore, we 
are able to include a wide range of controls into our models. Additionally, our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged when we consider different reference prices for the auction participants. We also consider the 
possibility that participants who use an automated bidding agent are self-selected and, therefore, differ 
from those who do not use an automated bidding agent, reassuring the robustness of our results.  
Although we find strong evidence for the effects described above, we cannot apply our findings from pay-
per-bid auctions directly to other domains. Nevertheless, our results are suggestive. Since the delegation 
of decision making to IT has a statistically and economically significant impact on the occurrence of the 
sunk cost effect, behavioral sunk costs may have a much higher impact than prior research suggests 
(Soman 2001). Further research, particularly experimental studies that randomly manipulate participants’ 
delegation to IT would be able to present additional evidence for this effect on other markets. 
Understanding the impact of delegating parts of the decision making to IT on the sunk cost effect has 
important managerial implications. Our study shows that not only monetary investments but also 
behavioral investments affect the occurrence of the sunk cost effect. These behavioral investments can 
occur in a wide range of situations, e.g., project management, policy making, financial markets, and 
auctions. Therefore, decision makers and, especially, managers should analyze all types of decision 
situations very carefully for potential behavioral investments. In case of substantial behavioral 
investments, the introduction of a software agent or another dispassionate advisor can detach decision 
makers from the decision process and, thus, prevent them from behavioral investments. This detachment 
could substantially increase the quality of their decision processes in various situations and, hence, 
provide them with a competitive advantage.  
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